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Abstract
In this paper I study the relationship between aggregate money balances and subse-
quent stock and bond returns. I find that levels of broad money multipliers (the ratios of
broad money to narrow money) forecast future returns with a negative sign, while changes
in these multipliers forecast returns with a positive sign. These findings indicate that lev-
els of multipliers are pro-cyclical: like the P/D ratio, they tend to be high at times of low
expected returns. The dynamics of these multipliers may also indicate changes in the vol-
ume of financial intermediation and the level of net leverage, consistent with credit-cycle
theories of macroeconomic fluctuations.
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continuing valuable feedback, Bige Kahraman, Dimitrios Tsomocos, Thomas Noe, Ludovic Phalippou for their
comments and suggestions.
1
1 Introduction
In recent years, we have lived through times of unprecedented money and credit creation. This
has prompted new interest in the role of money and credit in the economy and their impact
on financial markets and economic fundamentals. Many theoretical models have tried to link
credit creation and asset prices: however empirical work has not. In particular, a growing
literature discusses the importance of leverage in the economy (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Geanakoplos (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Shin (2014) and many
others), however very little evidence has documented the relationship between actual asset
returns and measures of leverage and credit. This work attempts to fill this gap.
This paper argues that money multipliers can be interpreted as measures of net economy-
wide leverage. Money multipliers are ratios of broad monetary aggregates to the monetary
base, thus connecting the dynamics of leverage with inside money creation in the economy.
Traditionally, it is common to distinguish between outside money, liabilities of the central
bank created by central bank fiat, and inside money, liabilities of the rest of the private banking
sector, with the latter responding endogenously to the demand for money of the wider economy.
I look at the past 59 years of U.S. stock market returns and show that what matters most
for stock prices is the creation of inside money per dollar of outside money, rather than the
quantity of money per se. I measure this inside money creation using money multipliers, ratios
of broader U.S. monetary aggregates to the U.S. monetary base, MB. I show that growth in
these multipliers robustly predicts stock market excess returns over the period January 1959
- December 2015 (see Table 1 below). These multipliers remain statistically significant after
controlling for outside money growth, while the t-statistics for outside money growth itself are
very low. The R¯2 of around 5% for quarterly data increases to up to 17% for annual data.
Table 1: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of log U.S. stock market excess returns (CRSP value-
weighted index): rem,t+1 = α + βXt + γ∆lnMBt + εt+1. Xt is the first difference of the log of the ratio of a
broad money aggregate to the monetary base MB. ∆lnMBt is the first difference of the log of the monetary
base. T-statistics in italics, quarterly data, 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4.
X β γ R¯2
∆M1/MB 0.74 0.23 4.69%
2.32 0.78
∆M2/MB 0.92 0.49 3.72%
1.75 0.95
∆MZM/MB 0.70 0.26 5.00%
2.47 0.88
I find that while multiplier growth predicts market returns positively, its level predicts
returns negatively. Thus, when more inside money is generated per dollar of MB, the multiplier
grows and so, subsequently, do stock prices. However, when the level of the multiplier is high,
stock prices are high and expected returns are low. Thus the money multiplier is pro-cyclical.
These results are robust to controlling for inflation, stock market volatility, federal funds rate,
total loan growth and some other key economic indicators, and also hold out of sample (Goyal
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and Welch (2008)). Furthermore, I show that changes in the multipliers are priced in the
cross-section. Value stocks are more sensitive to the growth of inside money, and up to 10%
of the variation of their quarterly returns is explained by variation in the money multiplier. I
separately estimate the impact of inside and outside money in the cross-section and find that
in all cases inside money matters more.
Theories of the money multiplier emphasise that it captures the net amount of leverage
created in the economy per 1 dollar of MB (Mishkin (2007)). This measure accounts for
netting of interbank loans as well as for synthetic leverage, such as repos and money market
funds. Thus, when more net leverage is generated in the economy, the multiplier grows, and
so do stock prices. One can speculate about the exact link between the two. One possibility
is that rising optimism or risk tolerance induces people to lend money to each other more
easily and invest in stocks more willingly. It is also possible that there is a financial friction
that results in inside money fluctuation and consequently in the fluctuation of asset prices, as
in financial accelerator models (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)) or models of funding liquidity
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Since the multiplier can also be viewed as the economy-
wide leverage ratio, my empirical findings can be reconciled with models of the leverage cycle
(e.g. Geanakoplos (2010)). Independently of the underlying mechanism the fact remains:
variation in inside money creation forecasts market excess returns.
My work contributes to the literature on the predictability of stock returns by macro vari-
ables as well as to the ongoing discussion about the role of money and credit in driving the
economy and financial markets. It fits into a growing literature following the ‘credit view’,
that suggests that the structure and quantities of bank credit affect real economic decisions
(Mishkin (1978), Bernanke (1983) and Gertler (1988)). Currently, most empirical papers in
this field look at credit and money creation in relation to the financial crisis (Congdon (2005),
Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda et al. (2015)), or at its impact on real activity (Adrian and
Shin (2010)). I look at the relationship of money and stock prices, and document the money
multiplier predictive power for aggregated stock market returns over different time horizons
and show that it is priced in cross-section. To my knowledge these empirical findings are novel.
Schularick and Taylor (2012) address the link between the ratio of bank loans/assets to money
balances and broad stock market indices across a range of countries. However, they also focus
on periods of financial crisis and show that lagged credit growth is a significant predictor of the
crisis. The empirical results presented in current paper are the closest to Adrian et al. (2013),
who look at predictability of stock and bond returns by different measures of broker-dealer
leverage. While the multiplier can be interpreted as a leverage ratio, this paper emphasises the
role of money creation for asset prices, and in particular, it pins down the greater importance
of inside money creation relative to outside money. This newly documented empirical fact
bridges the growing credit literature and classic Keynesian macroeconomics.
At the same time, the majority of the credit literature focuses on the effect of credit creation
alone, while this paper looks at the relative growth of inside money with respect to outside
money, thus capturing the dynamics of both. King and Plosser (1984) were the first ones to
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address the difference between outside and inside money, pointing out that the former react
to demand-type shocks, while the latter react more to supply-type shocks. With the growth
of direct corporate lending during the past 25 years, the difference between the dynamics
of inside money and outside money gets more pronounced, since demand and supply shocks
often happen in different times. Thus the combination of these two very different dynamics
underlines the role of efficient financial intermediation and results in strong predictive power
for the multiplier.
Inside money is fully endogenous. The active creation of inside money is a consequence of
economic activity, but at the same time is a prerequisite of it. The main take away of this
paper is that the relative dynamics of inside money predict market returns. One can speculate
about a theory that explains this finding, while this paper merely attempts to document it.
The rest of this work is organised as follows. Section II discusses inside money creation and
motivates the money multiplier as a proxy for economy-wide leverage, section III presents the
empirical findings and section IV concludes.
2 The money multiplier as a measure of leverage
This section provides a brief overview of the measures of money supply in the U.S. economy,
an introduction to the money multiplier, and a discussion of how the multiplier is a better
measure measure of the economy-wide leverage.
2.1 Measures of money supply, inside and outside money.
In the U.S., money supply is measured using monetary aggregates. The most narrow aggregate
is the monetary base (MB). It consists of cash and reserves and measures the most liquid
money in the economy. This aggregate is the only one that can be directly controlled by the
central bank via either printing money, or setting the federal funds rate, and is often referred
in literature as outside money (Hartley and Walsh (1986)). M1 and M2 monetary aggregates
consider a broader definition of money and are progressively less liquid. M1 consists of currency
in circulation and non-savings deposits; M2 additionally includes savings deposits and retail
money market funds; money zero maturity (MZM) consists of cash, savings deposits and money
market funds, both institutional and retail. The non-cash components of M1, M2 and MZM
result from the lending activity of the private sector and therefore are endogenous to the
economy. It is commonly referred to as inside money (Hartley and Walsh (1986), Lagos (2010)).
The dynamics of U.S. monetary aggregates and their main components over the past 55 years
is illustrated with Figure 1.1 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all monetary aggregates
and their the quarterly changes. Results presented in this paper use not seasonally adjusted
monetary data since the asset returns analysed in this paper are not seasonally adjusted either.
However, I do the robustness check and run the analysis using the seasonally adjusted monetary
data and find that it makes no difference for the main results.
1The detailed description of U.S. monetary aggregates is provided in Appendix.
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Figure 1: Monetary aggregates and their components. This graph shows the dynamics of the five U.S.
monetary aggregates from the narrowest, the U.S. Monetary Base (MB), to the broadest, M2 and MZM, in
Billions of U.S. Dollars over the period of 1959.01 - 2015.12. Data is available from FED H.6 Money Stock
Measures release, 224 quarterly data points, not seasonally adjusted, not inflation adjusted.1
Table 2: Summary statistics. Part (a) presents variables’ descriptive statistics estimated from the full
sample period, 1959.01 - 2014.12, quarterly data. Part (b) presents the contemporaneous correlations between
variables. ∆ for each variable is computed as a log change of the variable average quarterly value. σt and ρt,t−1
denote the standard deviation and the first order autocorrelation of the time series.
(a) Descriptive statistics
Mean Median σt Min Max ρt,t−1
MB 624.38 244.01 955.52 38.61 4076.1 0.998
M1 861.59 752.6 712.72 138.9 3093.8 1.000
M2 3558.12 2798.2 3210.96 290.2 12453.9 1.000
MZM 3424.71 2019.3 3685.46 278.2 13837.5 1.000
∆MB 0.020 0.016 0.039 -0.071 0.425 0.330
∆M1 0.014 0.014 0.018 -0.030 0.078 0.252
∆M2 0.017 0.017 0.010 -0.008 0.046 0.317
∆MZM 0.017 0.016 0.019 -0.036 0.145 0.370
(b) Correlation matrices
MB M1 M2 MZM ∆MB ∆M1 ∆M2 ∆MZM
MB 1.000 0.931 0.912 0.928 ∆MB 1.000 0.359 0.189 0.175
M1 1.000 0.982 0.968 ∆M1 1.000 0.564 0.513
M2 1.000 0.993 ∆M2 1.000 0.679
MZM 1.000 ∆MZM 1.000
Table 2 shows that the MB grew almost 100 times from its minimum of 38.6 Billion Dollars
at the beginning of 1959 to 4 Trillion at the end of 2015. M1 grew approximately 22 times,
while broad monetary aggregates M2 and MZM grew about 43 and 50 times, respectively.
From Figure 1 one can see that starting from the 1990s broad money started to grow rapidly.
The share of demand deposits declines, but the share of savings deposits, financial instruments
and money funds increases. At the end of 2015 MZM became larger than M2 due to a large
increase in institutional money market funds.
This can be explained by the growing sophistication of the financial intermediation sector
and the rise of money markets. Tight financial regulation and the development of information
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technology led to financial innovation in the 1970s and 1980s and the increasing importance of
financial markets.2 Further advances in computer technology reduced transaction costs, thus
making derivatives and other innovative financial instruments more attractive. The spread
of the internet made it easier for individuals to access companies’ information and reduced
screening costs. This made bank loans less competitive than new types of direct financing and
led to a shift of lending from traditional banks to financial markets. In the 1980s and 1990s
the shadow banking sector started to grow rapidly.1 Thus, commercial banks used to be a
source of 40% of the loanable funds for companies in 1974, but their share declined to 25%
in 2011 (Mishkin (2007)). This in turn resulted in the increased growth of the M2 and MZM
components.
Table 2 part b shows less than perfect correlation between broad monetary aggregates and
the MB. Given that the currency component remains the same in all aggregates, less than
perfect correlation comes from the dynamics of reserves and inside money component of M2
and MZM. To understand this discrepancy better, Figure 2 presents rolling window correlations
between the growth rates of broad monetary aggregates and the monetary base. M1 co-moves
the most with the MB, with correlation level reaching above 0.8 during the mid 1990s and
following the financial crisis. Average correlation between quarterly changes of M2 and MB
is only 0.19, never goes above 0.6 and turns negative during the 1990s, a period of financial
deregulation. It goes back up and reaches its maximum of 0.56 during the financial crisis, when
financial markets got thinner and the Dodd-Frank Act made them more regulated.
Figure 2: This graph shows the 5 year rolling window correlation of the M2 and M3 multipliers over the period
of 1959.01 - 2014.12, with corresponding 95% confidence bounds. Every 5 year window includes 20 quarterly
observations and is measured at the middle point of the time window considered.
Presented statistics shows the divergence of inside and outside money dynamics depending
on technological advances and regulatory climate: outside money is directly determined by
the monetary authority, and inside money is fully endogenously determined by the economic
2For example, until 1980, commercial banks were prohibited from paying interest rates on checkable de-
posits, and were subject to an interest rate ceiling on time deposits. This made bank deposits an unattrac-
tive investment during times of high inflation or volatile interest rates. In order to stop the outflow of funds
by investors seeking higher and more sensitive interest yields, commercial banks had to develop new, more
risky instruments, like sweep accounts, interest rate derivatives, commercial paper, etc.
1In this paper I call shadow banking all the non-bank type of lending, which in the context of monetary
aggregates represented by money market funds components of M2 and MZM.
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activity. The fact that the two types of money do not move one to one with each other implies
that the degree of financial intermediation and the speed of loan creation are time-varying.
2.2 The money multiplier
Now let’s look at the ratio of inside money to outside money. In this paper I refer to the ratio of
inside money to outside money as a broad money multiplier. It can be computed as a ratio of a
broad monetary aggregate, M1, M2 or MZM, to the monetary base. Thus, the multiplier tells
how much money supply is created out of a unit of cash or reserves and shows how far money
spreads in the economy. When inside money grow faster than the total supply of currency and
reserves, the multiplier increases. When loan creation slows down, the multiplier shrinks.
Figure 3 part a. presents the dynamics of three multipliers, M1/MB, M2/MB and MZM/MB,
during the period 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4, and part b presents their summary statistics. The mul-
tipliers do not exhibit a clear trend on a graph, and their average quarterly change is around
zero. M2/MB and MZM/MB vary more over time than M1/MB with corresponding standard
deviations of 2.4, 1.4 and 0.9. All three multipliers are highly persistent and have autocorrela-
tion coefficients close to one. This is due to high persistence of aggregates’ levels. Multipliers’
quarterly changes are positively correlated as well, but with smaller autocorrelations, 0.29 for
∆M1/MB, 0.35 for ∆M2/MB and 0.37 for ∆MZM/MB. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects
the null hypothesis of a unit root for all three multipliers’ growth rates.
The graph of broad multipliers’ dynamics has two apparent waves: (1) during the mid
1980s and (2) right before the financial crisis. The first wave can be explained by overall
economic expansion and lending growth. At the same time, inflation was slowly rising. This
contributed more to the expansion of broad money and did not affect the monetary base as
much. The prompt growth and then decline of the multiplier during the 1980s corresponds
to the U.S. savings and loan crisis. After the rise of financial innovation in the 1970s, the
financial authorities removed the deposit rate ceiling from the commercial banks to make them
more competitive with the growing financial markets. The financial deregulation took place
in 1980 and 1982, which led to an expansion of banks’ balance sheets and thus an increase
of the broad money supply and therefore the multiplier. However, new activities involved
greater risks and at the end of the 1980s a series of bankruptcies reduced the total supply of
loans and significantly thinned the financial intermediation sector. This, together with ensuing
regulation, led to a decrease in the multiplier. Subsequently, the multiplier grew particularly
fast from 2005 and up to the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. This is mainly attributed
to the growth of money market funds and the use of repurchase agreements, which in turn was
a result of the growing popularity of raising short term funds from the financial markets.
There is a structural break in the multipliers’ dynamics during the financial crisis, when
both broad multipliers drop during the second half of 2008. The drop is due to the rapid
growth of the monetary base, which almost doubled in three months, rising from $890 billion
in mid-September to $1,740 billion at the end of December. Such changes were driven by
the FED’s credit-oriented policies, which involved the purchase of non-Treasury securities,
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Figure 3: Graph in part a. shows the dynamics of the M1, M2, MZM money multipliers over the period of
1959.01 - 2014.12, and table in part b. presents their descriptive statistics. The multipliers are calculated by
dividing the average monthly level of a monetary aggregate by the average level of the U.S. Monetary Base
(MB) for the current quarter. ∆ for each variable is computed as a log change of the variable average quarterly
value. σt and ρt,t−1 denote the standard deviation and the first order autocorrelation of the time series. Shaded
areas on the graph mark the U.S. recessions as defined by NBER. Time series consists of 224 quarterly data
points and is adjusted for inflation.
(a) Money multipliers’ dynamics.
(b) Descriptive statistics.
Mean Median σt Min Max ρt,t−1
M1/MB 2.521 2.897 0.872 0.707 3.635 0.998
M2/MB 8.826 9.072 2.418 2.830 12.125 0.995
MZM/MB 7.166 7.446 1.385 3.124 10.201 0.980
∆M1/MB -0.007 -0.003 0.037 -0.348 0.098 0.285
∆M2/MB -0.004 0.000 0.039 -0.381 0.096 0.348
∆MZM/MB -0.003 0.000 0.040 -0.357 0.116 0.370
including commercial paper and asset-backed securities. Such purchases led to the expansion
of both the asset and the liability side of the FED balance sheet and resulted in an increase in
commercial banks’ excess reserves held at the FED.
2.3 The money multiplier as a measure of economy-wide leverage
2.3.1 Why is it a proxy for leverage?
Firm’s leverage is commonly defined as a ratio of total assets to equity or total debt to equity.
If we talk about an individual taking a loan, then leverage is computed as a ratio of asset value
individual gets relative to the amount of down payment Geanakoplos (2010). The leverage
ratio of a bank is defined as the bank’s total assets over its core capital, where the core capital
is a sum of equity capital and declared reserves. Since the broad economy has a mixture of
different types of agents, how would one measure economy-wide leverage?
Given that all money circulating in an economy are on the balance-sheet of a bank, or even
balance-sheets of several banks concurrently, one can assume the economy-wide leverage ratio
to be similar to the leverage ratio of a bank. In that case, the amount of aggregate credit can
serve as a proxy of total assets, and total currency and reserves can be seen as core capital.
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Going back to the definition of monetary aggregates, the MB consists of cash and reserves
of all commercial banks that are typically on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Broad
money components of M2 and MZM, such as different types of deposits, are on the liability
side of commercial banks’ balance sheets. Thus, a broad money multiplier, a ratio of broad
monetary aggregate to the MB, indicates the total value of deposits created in the economy
per unit of cash and reserves, and can be seen as a measure of economy-wide leverage.
2.3.2 How does it compare to other existing proxies of leverage?
The two most common measures of leverage to be found in the literature are total loans and
broker-dealer leverage. Broker dealer leverage is defined as the ratio of banks’ total assets to
its book equity, and is shown to predict market returns Adrian et al. (2013). Total loans are
defined as the sum of the outstanding consumer, commercial and industrial loans issued by all
commercial banks in the U.S. This definition is similar to Schularick and Taylor (2012), who
showed that changes in total loans predict upturns and downturns in the economy. How does
the multiplier differ from these two measures and why is it better?
Broker-dealer institutions include some commercial banks, but mainly are non-depositary
financial institutions, like investment banks. Broad monetary aggregates, however, include only
deposits of different types held at depository institutions (which are financial institutions that
obtain their funds mainly through deposits from the public, such as commercial banks, savings
and loan associations, savings banks, and credit unions). Thus, broker-dealer leverage refers
mainly to the shadow banking sector, and the multiplier accounts for commercial banks and
money market funds. Correlations between broker-dealer leverage log growth and multiplier log
growth are presented in Table 3, part a. Broker-dealer leverage is constructed following Adrian,
Etula and Moir (2013), using aggregate quarterly data on the levels of total financial assets and
total financial liabilities of U.S. security broker-dealers as captured in Table L.130 of the Federal
Reserve Flow of Funds. Contemporaneous correlations with growth rates of all three multipliers
are very low, though significantly positive. Interestingly, the correlation of multiplier growth
with broker-dealer leverage growth - one and two periods ahead - is significantly positive as
well, while the reverse is not true.
Total loans, as mentioned above, include outstanding consumer, commercial and industrial
loans issued by all commercial banks in the U.S. Monetary aggregates contain information
about the amount of the deposits in commercial banks that can serve as a proxy for the amount
of loans banks make. Additionally, broad aggregates M2 and MZM also contain information
about money market accounts, which serve as an important source of direct market lending.
This means that money multiplier growth captures some of the dynamics of the direct credit
as well. Furthermore, the measure of total loans can include double counting of the same
loans, while monetary aggregates are net measures of lending. To illustrate this point, table 3
part b. presents pairwise correlations of quarterly changes in total loans and changes in broad
monetary aggregates. Contemporaneous and lagged correlations are very close to zero for all
three monetary aggregates and are negative for M1 and MZM aggregates.
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Table 3: Correlations between different measures of leverage. ∆LevBD stands for quarterly log changes in
broker-dealer leverage, computed as a ratio of total broker-dealer assets to their total liabilities. Data is available
from the FED. ∆TL stand for quarterly log changes in total loans, computed as the sum of the outstanding
consumer, commercial and industrial loans issued by all commercial banks in the U.S. 1959 Q2-2015 Q4, 227
quarterly observations. For this number of observations any correlation coefficient that is greater than 0.1. in
magnitude is significantly different from 0 at 5% confidence level.
Part a. Correlations between broker-dealer leverage and multiplier growth.
∆M1/MBt ∆
M2/MBt ∆
MZM/MBt ∆LevBDt
∆LevBDt−1 -0.080 -0.068 0.000 -0.096
∆LevBDt 0.200 0.244 0.251 1.000
∆LevBDt+1 0.233 0.222 0.204 -0.096
∆LevBDt+2 0.202 0.240 0.215 0.150
Part b. Correlations between total loans and monetary aggregates growth.
∆M1t ∆M2t ∆MZMt ∆TLt
∆TLt−1 0.009 0.181 0.015 0.513
∆TLt -0.106 0.004 -0.165 1.000
∆TLt+1 -0.198 0.060 -0.192 0.513
∆TLt+2 -0.033 0.138 -0.084 0.353
2.3.3 Mechanism of loan and money creation
To better understand where the difference between the measure of total loans and monetary
aggregates comes from, let us look in detail at the mechanism of money creation. Imagine an
economy with three agents: one bank and two households, A and B. The bank has loans and
reserves on the asset side of its balance sheet, and equity and deposits on the liability side.
Households have loans that they provide and deposits as their assets, and have equity and
loans that they take as their liability. The scheme is presented in Figure 4.
At the beginning of time, date t = 0, the bank has reserves of $1 and equity of $1, while the
agents have nothing. Thus, in this economy the monetary base is $1 and the money multiplier
is one. Total loans are zero. Let’s assume that the next day, on date t = 1, the bank gives
a loan of $1 to agent A by creating a deposit for her. The balance sheets of the bank and of
the agent A change. Yet, the monetary base of this economy remains unchanged, $1 of broad
money is created, the multiplier equals 2, and the amount of total loans is $1. Anther day
passes, and on t = 2 agent A decides to lend her money to agent B, who in turn deposits this
money into his bank account. However, since agent A emptied her deposit, the total number
of deposits in the bank is still $1. This means that both the monetary base and the multiplier
stay unchanged, but number of total loans increased to $2. On the last day of this economy,
date t = 3, agent B decides to lend his money back to agent A, and agent A deposits it back
into the bank. The deposit of agent B is again empty and that of agent A is again $1, akin
to date t = 1. The monetary base and the multiplier again stay the same as before, but total
loans have increased up to $3.
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Figure 4: Scheme of loan creation in an economy with three agents: one bank and two households, A and B.
First part of the scheme presents balance sheet structure of the agents. Second part presents 4 time periods
during which different types of loans are created. MB stands for the monetary base, MM for money multiplier
and TL for total loans.
Thus, monetary aggregates capture how the issuance of loans contributes to money creation
in a whole economy. It nets out the interbank loans, thus excluding the double counting present
in the measure of total loans, and other loans that do not change the aggregate net purchasing
power. At the same time, the multiplier considers a broader spectrum of loans than broker-
dealer leverage does.
Studying the dynamics of the money multiplier in relation to asset returns helps us to
better understand the effect of inside money creation on financial markets. Inside money
growth contributes to an increase in economy-wide leverage, and might have the same effect on
aggregate market returns as the one that firm leverage has on firm returns. At the same time
money multiplier variations is an indicator of the degree of money creation in the economy,
total demand for loans and overall economic activity. In that sense, the multiplier acts as a
state variable and belongs to macroeconomic fundamentals.
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3 Empirical results
3.1 The money multiplier and stock returns
In this section, I analyse both aggregate stock market and cross-sectional excess returns. I
compute market log excess returns as the difference between the log of CRSP value-weighted
index returns and the log of the 1-month Treasury Bill rate. Data is obtained from CRSP.
For cross-sectional analysis I use 25 stock portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market, decile
portfolios sorted on momentum and decile portfolios sorted by past investment, using data
obtained from professor Kenneth French’s website.
First, I look at the forecasting power of money multiplier for the time-variation of market
returns and run the following one-period predictive regression:
rem,t+1 = α + ρ
Mx/MBt + β∆
Mx/MBt + εt+1
where Mx/MBt and ∆Mx/MBt are respectively level and quarterly growth rates computed for
three money multipliers, M1/MB, M2/MB and MZM/MB. Results are presented in Table 4,
part a.
Table 4: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of log U.S. stock market excess returns (returns on CRSP
value-weighted index minus 1-month T-Bill rate). Part a. estimates a regression specification with M1, M2,
MZM money multipliers’ levels and log changes. Part b. estimates a specification with one of the broad money
multipliers’ log changes, M1, M2, MZM, and log changes in the MB. Regressions are estimated over the whole
sample period, 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4, as well as over the two sub-sample periods: 1959 Q1 - 1989 Q4 and 1990
Q1 - 2015 Q4. Quarterly data. T-statistics in italics.
(a) Multiplier level and the growth rate: rem,t+1 = α+ ρMx/MBt + β∆Mx/MBt + εt+1.
1959 - 2015 1959 - 1989 1990 - 2015
ρ β R¯2 ρ β R¯2 ρ β R¯2
M1 -0.08 0.25 5.07% -0.05 0.15 0.90% -0.03 0.34 9.44%
-1.23 3.71 -0.55 1.71 -0.36 3.54
M2 -0.10 0.23 4.34% 0.04 0.10 -0.65% -0.14 0.35 10.44%
-1.53 3.40 0.38 1.08 -1.47 3.60
MZM -2.25 4.07 6.79% 0.02 0.19 1.99% -0.24 0.37 13.04%
-2.01 3.99 0.24 2.06 -2.44 3.80
(b) Multiplier growth and MB growth: rem,t+1 = α+ κ∆Mx/MBt + β∆MBt + εt+1.
1959 - 2015 1959 - 1989 1990 - 2015
κ β R¯2 κ β R¯2 κ β R¯2
M1 0.33 0.11 4.69% 0.16 0.07 1.14% 0.35 0.01 9.32%
2.32 0.78 1.78 0.76 1.20 0.02
M2 0.44 0.24 3.72% 0.27 0.24 1.90% 0.38 0.05 8.50%
1.75 0.95 2.04 1.81 0.73 0.10
MZM 0.35 0.12 5.00% 0.22 0.11 2.99% 0.13 -0.20 8.14%
2.47 0.88 2.35 1.14 0.37 -0.58
All three multipliers’ levels appear in the regression with a negative coefficient. In the full
sample, the M1 and M2 multipliers’ levels have slope statistically indistinguishable from zero,
and only the MZM multiplier level has a t-statistic greater than 2 in magnitude. At the same
time, the multipliers’ growth rates are strongly statistically significant, have t-statistics greater
than 3.4, and predict market returns with a positive sign. Looking closely at the sub-samples,
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one sees that the predictive power of M1/MB and M2/MB in the full sample comes solely from
the last 25 years, however MZM/MB is statistically significant in the early sample as well, with
a t-statistic of 2.11. Adjusted R2s are very high in the late sample for all three multipliers and
vary between 9.5% and 12%. Sample sizes for early and late samples are sufficiently large to
avoid small sample bias, 103 and 124 quarterly observations respectively. These findings can be
interpreted as evidence in favour of the growing importance of leverage during the last 25 years,
compared to the period between the 1960s and 1990s. To check these findings, I run individual
predictive regressions of market excess returns by levels of the multipliers and separately by
the multiplier growth rates and confirm my main results. Estimates for individual regressions
are presented in Table 13 in the Appendix.1
The negative loadings on multiplier levels suggest that at times when leverage is high,
expected market returns are low. However, the multiplier growth rate predicts next quarter
excess returns positively. It is possible that at times when leverage is still growing, risk bearing
capacity of financial system is still high and funding is easy to obtain. This leads to an increase
in desired asset purchases, and drives asset prices up. In this case, times of leverage growth
correspond to times of asset price growth, but only up to a point when leverage levels become
unsustainably high.
The economic significance of the multipliers is relatively small. A change of three standard
deviations in multiplier growth leads to only a one standard deviation change in next quarter
market returns. The descriptive statistics in Figure 2 shows that during the sample period,
quarterly multiplier growth volatility is around 0.04, while quarterly market returns are twice
as volatile, σM = 0.08.
As already discussed in the introduction, it is the money multiplier, rather than the total
money supply, which matters. I check whether stock return predictability is driven by changes
in the monetary base. I run a predictive regression of market excess returns on multipliers’
quarterly changes and control for quarterly changes in the MB. Results are presented in Table
4 part b. and show that the multiplier growth rate is significant, while the MB growth rate
is not. Thus, inside money growth matters for expected market returns, and outside money
growth does not.
A logical question, in this case, is whether dynamics of the inside money is driven by changes
to outside money. To answer this question I run a predictive regression of multiplier changes
on changes in the MB over different horizons. Results are presented in Table 5. I find that
outside money predicts M1 and M2 multiplier growth over the following 1-3 months, and MZM
multiplier growth only over 1 month, t-statistics are greater than 2. However, starting from the
one quarter horizon the slope in front of the MB growth rate is statistically and economically
indistinguishable from zero. Thus outside money have only a very short term effect on inside
money.
1Results presented here are for nominal market returns, however I run the same analysis on real market
excess return and results are very similar.
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Table 5: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of the multipliers’ growth rates by the MB growth rate:
∆Mx/MBt+1 = α+β∆MBt + εt+1. Quarterly data, 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4. Standardised coefficients. T-statistics
in italics.
1 month 3 month 6 month 1 year
β R¯2 β R¯2 β R¯2 β R¯2
M1/MB 0.11 1.80% 0.10 4.43% 0.07 1.56% 0.04 -1.08%
3.67 3.38 1.66 0.65
M2/MB 0.03 0.48% 0.03 0.90% -0.02 0.04% -0.08 3.46%
2.08 1.74 -1.02 -1.03
MZM/MB 0.04 0.53% 0.04 0.22% -0.03 -0.31% -0.10 2.74%
2.15 1.22 -0.81 -1.59
3.2 Different horizon predictability
Next, I try to understand how the predictive power of the multiplier depends on the chosen
horizon. I estimate a simple one-period predictive regression for different horizons, from 1 to
25 month. :
rem,t+1 = α + β∆
Mx/MBt + εt+1 (1)
Beta estimates, corresponding t-statistics and R¯2s are plotted against the chosen time
horizon and presented in Figure 5. Figures shows that β in the above predictive regression
changes its sign. Growth of the multiplier predicts market returns positively for a horizon up
to one quarter, and negatively for all horizons greater than two quarters.
Figure 5: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of log U.S. stock market excess returns (CRSP value-
weighted index) on multiplier growth for different time horizons: rem,t = α + β∆Xt−1 + εt, for M1, M2 and
MZM multipliers. Beta coefficients, corresponding t-statistics and adjusted R2 for each multiplier are plotted
on Y axes against the time horizon on X axes. Sample period 1959:01 - 2015:12. Standardised coefficients.
These results are consistent with theories, where intermediaries have risk-based capital con-
straints, like Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) or Adrian and Shin (2014). In this models
leverage is a key state variable that falls in downturns due to either increased collateral require-
ments or due to an increase in perceived market risk. Asset prices also decrease in downturns
and expected future returns become large. Thus the negative relationship between leverage
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growth and expected stock returns is consistent with pro-cyclical leverage. The fact that during
the first quarter returns respond positively to leverage growth can be explained by rapid stock
price appreciation, or may be driven by times of large shocks to leverage when the marginal
value of wealth is high.
The period of recent financial crisis is a good example of a large deleveraging in the economy,
during which stock prices also fell. During this period the multiplier experienced a large drop
related to the enormous growth of excess banks reserves at FED. The latter resulted from the
FED asset purchase programs triggered by the Lehman collapse. The same event also led to a
drop in stock market prices. However, further deleveraging of financial institutions exacerbated
market downturn following the mechanism described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
The shock to the multiplier is, however, significantly large to be identified as a structural break.
Thus, as a robustness check for all the results in this paper, I control for this structural break
in the MB by introducing a dummy for the whole year of 2008. I find that the main results
are not affected. Corresponding regression estimates can be found in Figure 7 and Figure 8 in
the Appendix.
3.3 Other controls and out-of-sample forecasting
I control for some well-understood economic variables to see whether the multiplier growth rate
remains an important predictor of expected market returns. In particular I control for: (1) the
term yield (TY ), which is computed as a difference between the 10-year Treasury note rate and
the 3-month Treasury bill rate; (2) smoothened price earnings ratio (PE); (3) Federal funds
rate (FF ), to account for the monetary policy regime, which is traditionally associated with the
level of money supply; (4) volatility index (V IX) as defined by CBOE, to control for market
volatility1; (5) growth rate of the purchase power of money (∆PP ), computed as a log change in
the M2 to GDP ratio; (6) credit spread (CS), computed as the difference between the Moody’s
Baa corporate bond yields and the 10-year U.S. constant maturity yields; (7) quarterly change
in total loans (∆TL), computed as the total amount of commercial, industrial and consumption
loans outstanding issued by all commercial banks. Monthly data for corporate and treasury
bonds, federal funds rate, GDP and total loans is available from FRED and is computed as
an average of daily figures, but the quarterly value is taken at the end of the period. Data on
VIX is available from CRSP. Smoothened PE data is available from Bob Shiller’s website.
I run a one-period predictive regression of market excess returns:
rem,t = α + βXt−1 + εt,
where Xt−1 is a vector of state variables that consists of the broad multiplier growth rate
and one of the controls. Table 6 presents OLS estimates of this regression, t-statistics and
1VIX represents the implied market expectation of future volatility, so to take quarterly averages would
produce a significantly smoother measure. Thus I consider the end of period values of VIX, which is also
consistent with how I compute quarterly values of the multiplier. This means that the Q1 (January, February
and March) VIX represents investors expectations for the month of April
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corresponding p-values for every newly added factor, as well as for the multiplier growth rate.
In this analysis I consider only the late sample of the whole available data, 1990 Q1 - 2014 Q4.
Partly because VIX data is only available for this period, and partly because the multiplier
appears to be more important during the last two decades, when the expansion of the financial
intermediation sector was most strongly reflected in broad money growth.
Table 6 shows that multiplier growth remains significant at the 5% confidence level after
controlling for each one of the mentioned economic indicators, while none of the control vari-
ables individually has a t-statistic high enough for the variables to be considered relevant for
predicting market returns. Economic significance of the multiplier in the late sample is also
higher, than of any other control variable. A change of one standard deviation in ∆lnM2/MB
predicts a change of 0.35 standard deviations in market returns, versus maximum of 0.13 stan-
dard deviations for other controls.1
I analyse the out-of-sample performance of each of the model specifications, using the
root mean squared error (GW∆RMSE) computed according to the methodology of Goyal
and Welch (2008). The chosen period of time, 1990 Q1 - 2014 Q4, contains 100 quarterly
observations. I start with the in-sample period of 76 quarters and construct the out-of-sample
forecast for the following 24 quarters using an expanding forecasting window. Tests show that
none of the models beats the forecast by the mean in out-of-sample. However, these conclusions
are not very robust and strongly depend on the choice of the in-sample and out-of-sample
periods. For example, if one considers an out-of-sample period that starts just two quarters
earlier, then numbers for models’ ∆RMSE look completely different. Those are presented for
comparison in the last column of Table 6 under GW∆RMSE∗. Similar analysis is produced
for another broad money multiplier, MZM/MB, with very similar results and can be found
in Table 14 in the Appendix.
1A change of one standard deviation in PE predicts a 0.27 standard deviation change in future returns,
which is close to the number obtained for money multiplier. However, PE is highly non-stationary, while
∆lnM2/MB is not.
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Table 6: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of market excess returns: rem,t = α + βXt−1 + εt, where Xt−1 is a vector of variables different for each model
specification. Variables are presented in the first row. ∆M2/MB - growth of the broad money multiplier, TY is the term yield, PE - price earnings ratio, V IX - level
of the CBOE volatility index, FF - federal funds rate, ∆PP - the growth rate of purchase power of money computed as the ratio of the level of the M3 to the GDP
level, and CS - the credit spread, computed as the difference between Moody’s BAA corporate bond yields and the 10 years US constant maturity yield. Estimates
of the regression slopes are presented in the first line, t-statistics in the second and p-values in the third. Last three columns present R¯2 for each model specification
for the analysed period of 1990 Q1 - 2014 Q4 and characteristics of models’ out-of-sample performance. GW∆RMSE compares out-of-sample forecast errors of each
model with a forecast error of the sample mean, as in Goyal and Welch (2008). For GW∆RMSE in-sample period is the first 76 quarters of the whole sample, for
GW∆RMSE∗ in-sample period is the first 76 quarters of the whole sample.
∆M2/MB TY PE CPI V IX FF PP CS ∆TL R¯
2 GW∆RMSE GW∆RMSE∗
beta 0.34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.37% -0.0082 0.0006
Model 1 t-stat 3.51 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.36 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.20% -0.0101 0.0004
Model 2 t-stat 3.62 0.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.41 0 -0.27 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.31% -0.0031 0.0066
Model 3 t-stat 4.26 0 -2.81 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.34 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 9.57% -0.0172 0.0009
Model 4 t-stat 3.51 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0.71 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.35 0 0 0 0.11 0 0 0 0 10.59% -0.0076 -0.0018
Model 5 t-stat 3.66 0 0 0 1.11 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0.27 0 0 0 0
beta 0.36 0 0 0 0 -0.13 0 0 0 11.00% -0.0081 0.002
Model 6 t-stat 3.73 0 0 0 0 -1.30 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0.20 0 0 0
beta 0.30 0 0 0 0 0 -0.09 0 0 10.07% -0.0098 0.0023
Model 7 t-stat 2.87 0 0 0 0 0 -0.82 0 0
p-value 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.41 0 0
beta 0.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 10.27% -0.0207 -0.0051
Model 8 t-stat 3.60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.94 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.35 0
beta 0.34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.09 10.32% -0.0096 -0.0001
Model 9 t-stat 3.55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.97
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33
beta 0.28 -0.662 -0.426 -0.373 0.400 -0.950 -0.164 -0.443 -0.093 21.82% -0.0226 -0.0115
Model 10 t-stat 2.55 -2.889 -3.655 -1.589 2.779 -2.794 -1.292 -2.161 -0.897
p-value 0.01 0.005 0.000 0.116 0.007 0.006 0.200 0.033 0.372
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3.4 The money multiplier and bond returns
In this subsection I look at predictability of treasury and corporate bond returns by money
multiplier. Treasury returns are returns on 1,2,5,7,10,20 and 30 year constant maturity Trea-
sury notes. Corporate bond returns are returns on Moody’s seasoned Aaa and Baa corporate
bond indices. Data obtained from CRSP.
Table 7 provides estimates from a predictive regression of the excess returns on two corporate
bonds portfolios, of Aaa and of Baa rated bonds, with multipliers levels and growth rates.
Aaa bond returns are better predicted by the multiplier, than Baa returns across subsamples:
multipliers’ β has higher statistical and economic significance in the regression for Aaa bonds
than in a regression for Baa bonds, and corresponding R¯2 is higher. For both corporate
portfolios multiplier growth predicts returns positively in the early sample and negatively in
the late sample. In the late sample, an increase of one standard deviation in MZM multiplier
results in a 0.26 standard deviations decrease in excess returns on Aaa portfolio and a 0.18
decrease in excess returns on Baa portfolio.
Table 7: Table presents OLS estimates of the predictive regression of corporate bond excess returns by levels
of three different money multipliers and by their quarterly changes: recb,t = α + βXt−1 + εt. Part a. presents
estimates for Aaa bond portfolio, and part b. for Baa portfolio. Estimates are computed for the full sample
period of 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4, as well as for two subsample periods, 1959 Q1 - 1989 Q4 and 1990 Q1 - 2015 Q4.
Standardised coefficients.
Part a. Aaa bonds.
1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4 1959 Q1 - 1989 Q4 1990 Q1 - 2015 Q4
X β t− stat R¯2 β t− stat R¯2 β t− stat R¯2
M1/MB -0.516 -8.90 25.81% 0.583 7.85 33.17% -0.680 -9.62 47.54%
M2/MB -0.707 -14.63 48.63% -0.536 -6.99 28.17% -0.679 -9.50 46.91%
MZM/MB -0.240 -3.64 5.17% 0.535 6.98 28.15% -0.490 -5.73 23.97%
∆M1/MB -0.112 -1.65 0.76% 0.043 0.47 -0.64% -0.084 -0.85 -0.27%
∆M2/MB -0.179 -2.68 2.68% 0.195 2.19 3.00% -0.228 -2.36 4.33%
∆MZM/MB -0.116 -1.73 0.87% 0.198 2.23 3.16% -0.262 -2.75 6.11%
Part b. Baa bonds.
1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4 1959 Q1 - 1989 Q4 1990 Q1 - 2015 Q4
X β t− stat R¯2 β t− stat R¯2 β t− stat R¯2
M1/MB -0.502 -8.59 24.44% 0.569 7.58 31.61% -0.650 -8.81 43.12%
M2/MB -0.691 -14.00 46.43% -0.508 -6.50 25.25% -0.666 -9.13 44.89%
MZM/MB -0.238 -3.62 5.10% 0.560 7.47 30.97% -0.498 -5.83 24.64%
∆M1/MB -0.066 -0.97 -0.03% 0.062 0.69 -0.44% 0.003 0.03 -1.00%
∆M2/MB -0.141 -2.09 1.48% 0.212 2.39 3.71% -0.154 -1.56 1.41%
∆MZM/MB -0.062 -0.92 -0.07% 0.266 3.05 6.38% -0.182 -1.88 2.43%
Table 8 presents estimates from the same predictive regression, but for Treasury notes with
fixed maturities. In full sample M2 and MZM multiplier growth is statistically significant for
predicting excess returns for treasuries of all maturities, have t-statistics of a magnitude greater
than 2. M1 multiplier growth is statistically significant only for 3, 5 and 7 year Treasury returns.
Looking at the regression estimates in sub-samples, one can notice that all the predictive power
of the multiplier growth rate in full sample comes from the past 30 years, i.e. during the period
of growing financial intermediation and sophistication of the banking sector. One big difference
of predictability results for the bond market compared to the stock market, is that predictability
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is high for monthly changes, but vanishes for quarterly changes.
Table 8: Table presents OLS estimates of the predictive regression of excess returns on Treasury constant
maturity: reTN,t = α + βXt−1 + εt, r
e
TN,t monthly excess return on CRSP fixed maturity indices, constructed
from Treasury notes with 1,2,5,7,10,20 and 30 year maturities. Estimates are computed for the full sample
period of 1959:01 - 2015:12, as well as for two subsample periods, 1959:01 - 1989:12 and 1990:01 - 2015:12. First
row for each model specification presents standardised regression coefficients, second row presents t-statistics,
third adjusted R2.
Full sample
1 year 3 years 5 years 7 years 10 years 20 years 30 years
∆M1/MB
-0.069 -0.087 -0.105 -0.114 -0.072 -0.045 -0.063
-1.79 -2.27 -2.77 -2.99 -1.87 -1.16 -1.65
0.3% 0.6% 1.0% 1.2% 0.4% 0.1% 0.3%
∆M2/MB
-0.069 -0.081 -0.096 -0.116 -0.077 -0.079 -0.106
-1.79 -2.12 -2.52 -3.04 -2.01 -2.06 -2.77
0.3% 0.5% 0.8% 1.2% 0.5% 0.5% 1.0%
∆MZM/MB
-0.067 -0.083 -0.092 -0.114 -0.080 -0.075 -0.098
-1.74 -2.16 -2.39 -2.98 -2.09 -1.95 -2.55
0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.8%
Early sample
1 year 3 years 5 years 7 years 10 years 20 years 30 years
∆M1/MB
-0.030 -0.039 -0.035 -0.060 -0.029 0.041 0.021
-0.58 -0.75 -0.66 -1.16 -0.55 0.78 0.40
-0.2% -0.1% -0.2% 0.1% -0.2% -0.1% -0.2%
∆M2/MB
-0.007 -0.021 -0.027 -0.066 -0.006 -0.012 -0.053
-0.13 -0.39 -0.51 -1.27 -0.11 -0.22 -1.01
-0.3% -0.2% -0.2% 0.2% -0.3% -0.3% 0.0%
∆MZM/MB
-0.042 -0.054 -0.031 -0.071 -0.031 -0.010 -0.034
-0.81 -1.03 -0.59 -1.37 -0.60 -0.19 -0.64
-0.1% 0.0% -0.2% 0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.2%
Late sample
1 year 3 years 5 years 7 years 10 years 20 years 30 years
∆M1/MB
-0.170 -0.177 -0.180 -0.172 -0.109 -0.107 -0.128
-3.03 -3.16 -3.22 -3.06 -1.92 -1.88 -2.26
2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 2.6% 0.9% 0.8% 1.3%
∆M2/MB
-0.189 -0.174 -0.161 -0.170 -0.125 -0.131 -0.157
-3.37 -3.09 -2.85 -3.03 -2.21 -2.31 -2.78
3.2% 2.7% 2.3% 2.6% 1.2% 1.4% 2.1%
∆MZM/MB
-0.152 -0.155 -0.155 -0.166 -0.124 -0.133 -0.159
-2.69 -2.75 -2.76 -2.95 -2.20 -2.35 -2.82
2.0% 2.1% 2.1% 2.4% 1.2% 1.4% 2.2%
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Figure 6: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of log excess returns on Treasury 5 year fixed maturity
CRSP index on the multiplier growth rate for different time horizons: reTN5,t = α + β∆Xt−1 + εt, for M1,
M2 and MZM multipliers. Beta coefficients, corresponding t-statistics and adjusted R2 for each multiplier
are plotted on Y axes against the time horizon on X axes. Sample period 1959:01 - 2015:12. Standardised
coefficients.
Figure 6 presents predictive regression estimates for a single type of Treasury, of arbitrary
chosen 5 year maturity, but over different time horizon, from 1 to 25 months. Slopes of the
regression, corresponding t-statistics and adjusted R2 are plotted against time horizons used
in the regression. Over a one month horizon, all three multipliers are statistically significant
in forecasting future treasuries’ excess returns, but only the M2 multiplier remains significant
for all horizons, t-statistic is always greater than 2 in magnitude. M2 multiplier growth of one
standard deviation predicts a decline in treasury returns of 0.15 standard deviations over the
next month, a decline of 0.25 standard deviations over the following two quarters and a decline
of 0.4 standard deviations over the next year.
This results are also consistent with the theories of pro-cyclical leverage and the mechanism
described earlier for stock markets. However there is one difference. Multiplier growth predicts
changes in expected stock returns positively for one quarter ahead, and negatively for all
horizons above two quarters. I associate it with the fact that growing leverage indicates good
times for financial markets, when funding can be easily obtained and used for asset purchases.
Since bonds are less risky investments, they experience less demand fluctuations associated
with good and bad times than stocks do. Thus the relationship between leverage and expected
bond returns is always negative. When leverage is high, markets are saturated and bond prices
are high, meaning that expected returns are low.
3.5 The money multiplier and the cross-section of returns
The previous sections presented evidence that multiplier growth is a risk factor for aggregate
market returns. Now I examine whether this risk factor is priced in the cross-section of stocks.
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The analysis of predictability of market returns time-variation shows that the multiplier is
pro-cyclical. When the multiplier is high, expected returns are low. This is true for all horizons
above two quarters and allows to suggest a negative relationship between the multiplier and
marginal utility of wealth. When the multiplier is high, stock prices are booming, total wealth
is growing and its marginal utility is decreasing. In this case investors will require higher
compensation for holding assets that co-move more with the multiplier, and the corresponding
price of risk in the cross-section of stock returns should be positive.
Table 9 presents estimates from a one-period predictive regression (1) of 25 portfolios sorted
on size and book-to-market by the growth rate of the M2 multiplier. Figures 15 and 16 in
the Appendix presents estimates of the same regression, but for M1 and MZM multipliers
respectively.
Table 9: OLS estimates from a predictive regression: rep,t = α + β∆M2/MBt−1 + εt, where rep,t is a return
on 25 U.S. stock portfolios formed on size and book-to-market equity on the M2 multiplier changes. Quarterly
data aggregated from monthly data obtained from professor Kenneth French’s website. 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4,
228 observations. For each portfolio, top row presents standardised regression slope coefficients, second row
presents t-statistics, last row presents adjusted R2.
BM Low BM2 BM3 BM4 BM Hi
ME Small β 0.114 0.116 0.152 0.197 0.208
t-stat 1.7 1.7 2.3 3.0 3.1
R¯2 0.82% 0.87% 1.82% 3.34% 3.76%
ME2 β 0.110 0.138 0.171 0.240 0.268
t-stat 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.6 4.1
R¯2 0.73% 1.42% 2.39% 5.15% 6.54%
ME3 β 0.112 0.162 0.168 0.202 0.172
t-stat 1.7 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.6
R¯2 0.78% 2.12% 2.31% 3.53% 2.43%
ME4 β 0.100 0.156 0.211 0.236 0.248
t-stat 1.5 2.3 3.2 3.6 3.8
R¯2 0.54% 1.93% 3.89% 4.97% 5.54%
ME Big β 0.099 0.171 0.194 0.287 0.220
t-stat 1.5 2.6 2.9 4.4 3.3
R¯2 0.50% 2.40% 3.22% 7.56% 4.29%
Table 9 shows that the slope of the estimated regression, its statistical significance and
adjusted R2 are increasing with book-to-market, however there is no clear relationship with
a firm size. The same pattern is observed for M1 and MZM multiplier. This results do not
imply that exposure to leverage risk drives value premium, but they serve as an evidence that
the same factors can be driving the two. Intuitively, it is possible that companies with higher
book-to-market ratios are more sensitive to changes in funding liquidity and thus load more
on the leverage growth factor. At the same time, if changes in economy-wide leverage reflect
changes in the broad investment opportunity set, then companies with initially more limited
investment opportunities would be more susceptible to it. The latter is true for high book-to-
market companies, if one views book-to-market ratio as a proxy for inverse of Tobin’s Q, as
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for example in Xing (2008). Following this theory, high book-to-market companies have lower
productivity levels and therefore can afford to undertake a limited number of new investment
projects.
Table 10 presents estimates from Fama-MacBeth tests for 25 portfolios sorted on size and
book-to-market. Table shows that all three multipliers are priced in the cross-section. The
price of risk is small, but positive and statistically significant, as expected. At the same time,
the intercepts are economically and statistically insignificant, which implies that all returns in
excess of the risk free rate are a compensation for systematic risk, which is well captured by
multiplier growth. This result is also robust to controlling for MB growth.
Table 10: Estimates from Fama-MacBeth prices of risk and corresponding t-statistics for the cross-sectional
predictive regression for 25 stock portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market ratio on the multiplier growth
rate.
∆M1/MB ∆
M2/MB ∆
MZM/MB
Lambda mean 0.074 0.0677 0.0909
t-stat 2.90 2.37 2.68
Intercept mean -0.0002 0.0041 -0.003
t-stat -0.03 0.42 -0.26
Next, I run cross-sectional analysis on momentum sorted portfolios and stock portfolios
sorted by past investment. The latter is defined as a relative change in total assets of the
firm. Data for both is from professor Kenneth French’s data library. Cross-sectional regression
estimates are summarised in Table 11 and corresponding Fama-MacBeth prices of risk in Table
12.
While there are no clear patterns for portfolios sorted on past returns, Table 11, part a.,
there is a clear pattern for portfolios sorted on past investments, Table 11, part b. Slope coeffi-
cients, statistical significance and adjusted R2 are increasing from high to low. Thus, multiplier
growth better predicts future growth of excess returns for firms with low past investments. The
channel here is similar to the one for the value anomaly. Companies with low past investment
are likely to have some limitation in exploiting new investment opportunities, thus they would
be affected more when the number of investment opportunities decreases, or when the amount
of available funding shrinks.
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Table 11: Estimates from a predictive regression of portfolio excess returns on the multiplier growth rate: rep,t = α+ β∆Mx/MBt−1 + εt. Part a. presents estimates of
this regression for 10 stock portfolios sorted on past returns, and part b. for 10 stock portfolios sorted on past investments. Past investment is defined as a past year
relative change in total assets of the firm. Quarterly data aggregated from monthly data obtained from professor Kenneth French’s website. 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4, 228
observations. For each portfolio, top row presents standardised regression slope coefficients, second row presents t-statistics, last row presents adjusted R2.
(a) Portfolios sorted on past returns.
Lo PRIOR PRIOR 2 PRIOR 3 PRIOR 4 PRIOR 5 PRIOR 6 PRIOR 7 PRIOR 8 PRIOR 9 Hi PRIOR
∆M1/MB β 0.158 0.208 0.176 0.209 0.198 0.161 0.144 0.188 0.221 0.176
t-stat 2.4 3.2 2.7 3.2 3.0 2.4 2.2 2.9 3.4 2.7
R¯2 2.05% 3.89% 2.66% 3.95% 3.50% 2.14% 1.62% 3.09% 4.48% 2.68%
∆M2/MB β 0.108 0.164 0.139 0.182 0.166 0.119 0.104 0.171 0.196 0.152
t-stat 1.6 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.5 1.8 1.6 2.6 3.0 2.3
R¯2 0.72% 2.26% 1.49% 2.88% 2.33% 0.98% 0.63% 2.48% 3.41% 1.88%
∆MZM/MB β 0.122 0.185 0.154 0.204 0.197 0.150 0.142 0.217 0.220 0.197
t-stat 1.8 2.8 2.3 3.1 3.0 2.3 2.1 3.3 3.4 3.0
R¯2 1.06% 2.97% 1.93% 3.73% 3.44% 1.82% 1.57% 4.27% 4.40% 3.43%
(b) Portfolios sorted on past investments.
Lo PRIOR PRIOR 2 PRIOR 3 PRIOR 4 PRIOR 5 PRIOR 6 PRIOR 7 PRIOR 8 PRIOR 9 Hi PRIOR
∆M1/MB β 0.264 0.334 0.262 0.328 0.276 0.267 0.256 0.257 0.178 0.196
t-stat 3.9 5.1 3.9 5.0 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.8 2.6 2.9
R¯2 6.50% 10.69% 6.40% 10.34% 7.18% 6.70% 6.09% 6.16% 2.70% 3.38%
∆M2/MB β 0.209 0.286 0.239 0.285 0.252 0.249 0.248 0.240 0.146 0.158
t-stat 3.1 4.3 3.5 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 2.1 2.3
R¯2 3.91% 7.72% 5.27% 7.67% 5.91% 5.76% 5.69% 5.30% 1.67% 2.03%
∆MZM/MB β 0.266 0.318 0.271 0.323 0.292 0.289 0.282 0.285 0.193 0.204
t-stat 4.0 4.8 4.1 4.9 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.3 2.8 3.0
R¯2 6.60% 9.70% 6.90% 10.00% 8.08% 7.93% 7.53% 7.67% 3.26% 3.71%
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Table 12: Estimates of Fama-MacBeth prices of risk and corresponding t-statistics for the cross-sectional
predictive regression for 10 stock portfolios sorted by past returns and 10 portfolios sorted by past investments
on the multiplier growth rate.
(a) Portfolios sorted on past returns (b) Portfolios sorted on past investments
∆M1/MB ∆
M2/MB ∆
MZM/MB ∆
M1/MB ∆
M2/MB ∆
MZM/MB
Lambda mean 0.0999 0.1594 0.2211 0.058 0.0538 0.0616
t-stat 3.71 5.23 5.26 2.09 1.77 1.88
Intercept mean -0.0081 -0.0136 -0.0292 0.027 0.0298 0.0254
t-stat -0.89 -1.48 -2.48 0.87 0.96 0.80
All cross-sectional tests presented in this section I also run controlling for growth of the
monetary base. In each case I find that the latter is statistically insignificant in predicting
future returns and is not priced in the cross-section, while the multiplier growth rate remains
a priced factor.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I introduce a measure of economy-wide leverage, the money multiplier. The
multiplier is computed as a ratio of a broad monetary aggregate to the MB and corresponds to
the ratio of inside to outside money. I show that the multiplier growth rate significantly and
robustly predicts stock market excess returns on aggregate and in the cross-section, as well as
it predicts bond returns for a range of bond maturities. This links inside money creation in
the economy to stock and bond price dynamics across business cycle.
As a proxy for the level of economy-wide leverage, the money multiplier may serve as an
indicator of risk bearing capacity of financial system, tightness of margin constraints that are
so difficult to observe, and generally can be used as a state variable for dynamics induced by
financial frictions. In this paper, I do not argue that the multiplier drives asset returns, but
merely show its strong forecasting power. It is likely that the multiplier reacts to the same
endogenous changes in the economy that affect asset prices. Since the multiplier is determined
by the amount of money that has actually been borrowed in the economy, it can be seen as an
indicator of funding liquidity, a state variable that otherwise is not so easily captured.
The multiplier has a very different dynamics compared to other common measures of lever-
age, like broker-dealer leverage or total loans. Compared to the former, the multiplier considers
loans made by a different financial sector, commercial banks, and partly accounts for the direct
market lending too, due its money market funds component. Compared to total loans, the
multiplier excludes double counting of the same loans and therefore represents net lending in
the economy.
Empirical predictions obtained in this paper for stock and bond excess returns are consistent
with theories of risk based funding constraints, that generate pro-cyclical leverage as a state
variable (Geanakoplos (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Shin (2014)).
When the multiplier is high, expected returns are low. Thus the general mechanism that
relates changes in multiplier is similar to the models of financial intermediaries leverage. Agents
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adjust risk exposure of their asset portfolios based on broad economic conditions. This affects
demand for assets and their equilibrium price. However, when dealing with intermediary or
broker-dealer leverage one considers risk exposures of financial intermediaries, very specific
economic agents, subject to constraints arising from agency problems. Looking at the broad
money multiplier allows to assess changes in investors risk exposure more generally: it unites
borrowing by financial and private sector in one measure. Thus the multiplier is a better
indicator of changes in marginal utility of wealth in different states of the economy. It serves
as a macroeconomic state variable, part of the stochastic discount factor, that characterises
the aggregate agents response to changes in investment opportunity set.
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A U.S. Monetary Aggregates and their components
The definition and the composition of different monetary aggregates varies across countries.
Since this paper focuses on the U.S. economy, I use the definition of monetary aggregates
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank. MB, M1, M2, MZM and M3 are progressively more
inclusive measures of money with the narrowest component being the adjusted monetary base
(MB). The monetary base is defined as those liabilities of the monetary authorities that house-
holds and firms use as media of exchange and that depository institutions use to satisfy statu-
tory reserve requirements and to settle interbank debts. In the United States, this includes
currency (including coin) held outside the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Banks (referred to
as currency in circulation) plus deposits held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve
Banks. The demand of public onto these liquid assets allows the monetary authority to control
the prevailing money market interest rate.1
M1 includes funds that are readily accessible for spending, i.e. the most liquid forms of money.
It consists of (1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Banks, and the vaults
of depository institutions, (2) travellers checks of nonbank issuers, (3) demand deposits, and
(4) other checkable deposits, which consist primarily of negotiable order of withdrawal accounts
at depository institutions and credit union share draft accounts.
M2 includes a broader set of financial assets held primarily by households. M2 consists
of M1 plus (1) savings deposits (which include money market deposit accounts), (2) small-
denomination time deposits (time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000) issued by financial
institutions, and (3) balances in retail money market mutual funds (funds with initial invest-
ments under $50,000), net of retirement accounts.
M3 consists of M2 and (1) all other certificates of deposits (large time deposits, institutional
money market mutual fund balances), (2) deposits of eurodollars and (3) repurchase agree-
ments. Monitoring of M3 was discontinued in March 2006, because M3 “does not appear to
convey any additional information about economic activity that is not already embodied in M2
and has not played a role in the monetary policy process for many years”.2, 3
MZM stands for money zero maturity and is calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. It equals M2 minus small-denomination time deposits, plus institutional money market
mutual funds (that is, those included in M3 but excluded from M2). The aggregate itself was
proposed by Motley (1988).
1Details about the measurement of the Monetary Base can be found in the Appendix. The MB data is
adjusted for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements on the quantity of base money held by
depositories.
2http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/discm3.htm
3In my analysis I use the time series provided by OECD: "Main Economic Indicators - complete
database"
27
B The multiplier levels and growth rates and market ex-
cess returns
Table 13: Table presents OLS estimates of the predictive regression of market premium by levels
of three different money multipliers and separately by their quarterly changes. Estimates are
computed for the full sample period of 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4, as well as for two subsample periods,
1959 Q1 - 1989 Q4 and 1990 Q1 - 2015 Q4.
Full sample: 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4 Early sample: 1959 Q1 - 1989 Q4 Late sample. 1990 Q1 - 2015 Q4
b tStat R¯2 b tStat R¯2 b tStat R¯2
M1/MB -0.036 -0.53 -0.32% -0.040 -0.44 -0.66% 0.003 0.03 -1.00%
M2/MB -0.052 -0.77 -0.18% 0.021 0.23 -0.78% -0.084 -0.84 -0.30%
MZM/MB -0.088 -1.31 0.32% 0.044 0.49 -0.63% -0.154 -1.53 1.32%
∆M1/MB 0.234 3.53 4.86% 0.151 1.68 1.48% 0.341 3.54 10.23%
∆M2/MB 0.208 3.13 3.76% 0.094 1.04 0.06% 0.327 3.39 9.41%
∆MZM/MB 0.238 3.62 5.09% 0.188 2.11 2.76% 0.316 3.27 8.75%
C Predictability over different horizons with crisis dummy
Figure 7: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of log U.S. stock market excess returns
(CRSP value-weighted index) that includes a crisis dummy for the whole year of 2008. Quar-
terly data, 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4. Standardised coefficients.
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Figure 8: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of log U.S. stock market excess returns
(CRSP value-weighted index) that includes a crisis dummy for the whole year of 2008 and an
interaction term. Quarterly data, 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4. Standardised coefficients.
D Controls and out-of-sample predictability for MZM/MB
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Table 14: OLS estimates from a predictive regression of market excess returns: rem,t = α + βXt−1 + εt, where Xt−1 is a vector of variables different for each model
specification. Variables are presented in the first row. ∆MZM/MB - growth of the broad money multiplier, TY is the term yield, PE - price earnings ratio, V IX - level
of the CBOE volatility index, FF - federal funds rate, ∆PP - the growth rate of purchase power of money computed as the ratio of the level of the M3 to the GDP
level, and CS - the credit spread, computed as the difference between Moody’s BAA corporate bond yields and the 10 years US constant maturity yield. Estimates
of the regression slopes are presented in the first line, t-statistics in the second and p-values in the third. Last three columns present R¯2 for each model specification
for the analysed period of 1990 Q1 - 2014 Q4 and characteristics of models’ out-of-sample performance. GW∆RMSE compares out-of-sample forecast errors of each
model with a forecast error of the sample mean, as in Goyal and Welch (2008). For GW∆RMSE in-sample period is the first 76 quarters of the whole sample, for
GW∆RMSE∗ in-sample period is the first 76 quarters of the whole sample.
∆MZM/MB TY PE CPI V IX FF PP CS ∆TL R¯
2 GW∆RMSE GW∆RMSE∗
beta 0.32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.29% -0.0015 -0.0014
Model 1 t-stat 3.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.35 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.52% -0.0008 -0.0008
Model 2 t-stat 3.54 1.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0.26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.39 0 -0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.29% 0.0052 0.0045
Model 3 t-stat 4.04 0 -2.60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.34 0 0 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 8.96% -0.0003 -0.0002
Model 4 t-stat 3.44 0 0 0.80 0 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0.43 0 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.33 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 0 0 9.32% -0.0079 -0.0075
Model 7 t-stat 3.47 0 0 0 1.02 0 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0.31 0 0 0 0 0
beta 0.37 0 0 0 0 -0.17 0 0 0 11.08% 0.0005 0.0004
Model 8 t-stat 3.74 0 0 0 0 -1.73 0 0 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 0 0 0
beta 0.28 0 0 0 0 0 -0.11 0 0 9.43% 0.0019 0.0022
Model 9 t-stat 2.74 0 0 0 0 0 -1.08 0 0 0
p-value 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.28 0 0 0
beta 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0 9.10% -0.005 -0.0044
Model 10 t-stat 3.44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.89 0 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.38 0 0
beta 0.32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.09 9.19% -0.0024 -0.0025
Model 9 t-stat 3.38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.94 0
p-value 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.35 0
beta 0.28 -0.674 -0.419 -0.351 0.433 -1.051 -0.187 -0.495 -0.093 22.69% -0.0047 -0.0045
Model 10 t-stat 2.70 -2.950 -3.698 -1.473 3.107 -3.022 -1.536 -2.494 -0.908 0
p-value 0.01 0.004 0.000 0.144 0.003 0.003 0.128 0.015 0.366 0
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D.1 Cross-sectional results for M1/MB and MZM/MB
Table 15: Estimates of the predictive regression: rep,t = α + β∆M1/MBt−1 + εt for 25 U.S. stock portfolios
formed on size and book-to-market equity on the M2 multiplier changes. Quarterly data aggregated from
monthly data obtained from Kenneth French website. 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4, 228 observations. For each portfolio,
top row presents standardised regression slope coefficients, second row presents t-statistics, last row presents
adjusted R2.
BM Low BM2 BM3 BM4 BM Hi
ME Small β 0.157 0.170 0.207 0.255 0.284
t-stat 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.9 4.4
R¯2 1.94% 2.37% 3.72% 5.88% 7.39%
ME2 β 0.145 0.186 0.218 0.284 0.327
t-stat 2.2 2.8 3.3 4.3 5.1
R¯2 1.60% 2.92% 4.15% 7.38% 9.94%
ME3 β 0.150 0.206 0.211 0.253 0.239
t-stat 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.8 3.6
R¯2 1.74% 3.68% 3.86% 5.76% 5.09%
ME4 β 0.133 0.190 0.252 0.275 0.292
t-stat 2.0 2.8 3.8 4.2 4.5
R¯2 1.26% 3.05% 5.74% 6.89% 7.83%
ME Big β 0.110 0.189 0.227 0.306 0.270
t-stat 1.6 2.8 3.4 4.7 4.1
R¯2 0.72% 3.02% 4.53% 8.66% 6.68%
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Table 16: Estimates of the predictive regression: rep,t = α+ β∆MZM/MBt−1 + εt for 25 U.S. stock portfolios
formed on size and book-to-market equity on the M2 multiplier changes. Quarterly data aggregated from
monthly data obtained from Kenneth French website. 1959 Q1 - 2015 Q4, 228 observations. For each portfolio,
top row presents standardised regression slope coefficients, second row presents t-statistics, last row presents
adjusted R2.
BM Low BM2 BM3 BM4 BM Hi
ME Small β 0.152 0.162 0.203 0.241 0.248
t-stat 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.7 3.8
R¯2 1.82% 2.14% 3.59% 5.24% 5.58%
ME2 β 0.146 0.178 0.208 0.269 0.285
t-stat 2.2 2.7 3.2 4.1 4.4
R¯2 1.63% 2.66% 3.81% 6.63% 7.55%
ME3 β 0.149 0.199 0.210 0.224 0.204
t-stat 2.2 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.1
R¯2 1.74% 3.46% 3.87% 4.50% 3.65%
ME4 β 0.139 0.198 0.236 0.253 0.251
t-stat 2.1 3.0 3.6 3.9 3.8
R¯2 1.44% 3.42% 5.01% 5.82% 5.74%
ME Big β 0.140 0.203 0.224 0.294 0.237
t-stat 2.1 3.1 3.4 4.5 3.6
R¯2 1.48% 3.61% 4.47% 8.00% 5.11%
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